One of the formal charges which has been made against the most prominent position in the epistemology of disagreement debate, known as the Equal Weight View, is that, in conjunction with a cluster of further assumptions, it imposes implausible restrictions on the agents’ priors, that is, compliance with Principle of Indifference as well as another principle which we dubbed “‘Mysterious Coordination”. In this essay, we address this charge and argue that not all is lost for the Equal Weight View. Firstly, we claim that one of the assumptions from which the principles are derived, known as Global Competence, is not only unmotivated in the peer debate, but also not recommended in general. Secondly, we formally show that dropping Global Competence blocks the entailment of the Principle of Indifference from the Equal Weight View and neutralizes all of the worrisome consequences which stemmed from it.

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