A genealogical/aetiological explanation reconstruct the causal processes that brought a norm, a concept, or a practice into existence, and it can feature in either debunking or vindicatory arguments (i.e., arguments strengthening or weakening one’s confidence in their objects’ standing).

Moral philosophers and epistemologists have been investigating the topic for several years, but their focus has been selective in at least two respects: they almost exclusively considered the debunking capacities of genealogical explanations and, more importantly, they concerned themselves almost exclusively with their metaethical implications. 

Fortunately, some scholars recently broadened the focus by drawing attention on vindicatory arguments and on their normative implications, showing that genealogical/aetiological arguments can affect the space of reasons. But how far is the space of reasons actually affected by these vindicatory arguments? This is the fundamental question of this essay. I address it by unpacking it in three sub-questions respectively pertaining to (1) the kind, (2) the aim and (3) the scope of the reasons provided through genealogical explanations: 

1) Which kind of reasons are these? 

2) What are these reasons for? 

3) Whom are these reasons for? 

In the talk I will address these question and conclude that the degree to which vindicatory arguments can affect our normative reasoning is limited in peculiar ways, but not seriously so.

Link to MS Teams meeting