We have the pleasure to invite you to another research seminar. Christoph Merdes is going to give a talk: "Rational Injustice, Irrational Justice?”. The seminar will take place on the 1st of February at 5:30 p.m. in the room 25 on Grodzka Street and via MS Teams.

Abstract

Standard cases of testimonial injustice are often simple in the sense that the perpetrator of the injustice is rendered irrational by their injustice. If I dismiss a nurse’s valid medical advice because “she is just a nurse”, I am not only commit a testimonial injusitce, but I also behave irrationally. However, there seem to be cases in which this link between justice and rationality is severed. Some prejudices, for instance, function as self-fulfilling prophecies. Thus, they create situations in which the prejudice seems to be accurate, and hence, the apparent injustice to be the only rational choice. The case is further complicated by the fact that such situations look structurally very similar to cases that are not commonly assumed to be cases of testimonial injustice, but instead just of rational, if maybe unfortunate empirical generalizations about a group. Are we thus rationally bound to be unjust?

I discuss two approaches to answer in the negative. First, I discuss a historical approach to testimonial injustice that would allow to distinguish between valid empirical generalizations and prejudicial testimonial injustice by reference to their origin in previous interaction. This approach seems to be in line with some of the language in the debate, such as talk of epistemic reparations, but I will argue that it is deeply flawed for a number of reasons.

I then present a game-theoretic model of the situations described and analyze it in terms of a power dynamic that includes, crucially, the anticipation of the interlocutor’s behavior. I defend this style of  model as a more adequate framework to distinguish the two kinds of cases and to help re-align justice with rationality.

 

Link to the MS Teams meeting