Polonez BIS: Równość, wolność i dominacja - Interdyscyplinarne Centrum Etyki (INCET)
Równość, wolność i dominacja

Projekt badawczy "Równość, wolność i dominacja" współfinansowany przez Komisję Europejską i Narodowe Centrum Nauki w ramach grantu Marie Skłodowska-Curie COFUND w ramach konkursu POLONEZ BIS 3.
Podstawowe informacje
- Tytuł projektu: Równość, wolność i dominacja
- Czas trwania: 1 stycznia 2024 - 31 grudnia 2025
- Kierownik projektu: dr Callum Macrae (callum.macrae@uj.edu.pl)
- Opiekun naukowy: dr hab. Tomasz Żuradzki, prof. UJ
Opis popularyzatorski
Suppose that X is Y’s slave. Y can, if they wish, command and prohibit X from doing a wide range of things. Suppose further, however, that Y chooses not to exercise this power. Although Y never actually interferes with X’s plans and actions, X’s position with respect to Y nevertheless seems importantly objectionable. Political and social philosophers refer to X’s situation with respect to Y as domination: X is said to be dominated by Y. The major goal of this research project is to work out precisely why domination is objectionable, and to explore the institutional and policy-related implications that follow.
Contemporary political philosophy provides two major competing answers to the question of why domination is objectionable. On the one hand, neo-republicans (such as Pettit and Lovett) argue that domination is bad because it is offensive to the value of freedom. When we are dominated, we are under the power of another, and somebody who lives under the power of another is not truly free. On the other hand, relational egalitarians (such as Anderson and Schemmel) argue that domination is bad because it is offensive to the value of equality. When we are dominated, there is someone who controls us, and those who control others cannot stand to those others as equals; they relate as superior to inferior, rather than on equal terms. In their shared focus on the centrality of power to political philosophy, there are significant parallels between neo-republicanism and relational egalitarianism. However, despite these parallels, there is still yet to have been a prolonged attempt to connect these areas of the political philosophy literature, and to answer the sorts of questions that emerge from such a connection.
In this research project I will fill this gap in the literature by undertaking an extensive examination of the relationships between equality, freedom, and domination. This major goal will be served by pursuing two subsidiary goals. The first will consist of investigating a series of questions regarding the relationship between the neo-republican conception of domination as unfreedom and the relational egalitarian conception of domination as inequality. Given the parallels between them, we might think that the two accounts are essentially compatible. However, each theory also appears to provide a different answer to a series of important questions, such as the precise moral character of domination, the significance of independence, and the connection between opposition to domination and alternative political values, such as solidarity. Moreover, there are important criticisms that have been pressed against each of the theories that do not appear to apply in a straightforward way to the other theory. If the two theories provide different answers to important questions, and are susceptible to different criticisms, might it be the case that the two accounts depart from one another in important ways? And if so, is there a reason to prefer one account to the other?
The second subsidiary goal is to examine the practical implications of the results obtained by researching the questions posed in the previous paragraph. Both neo-republicanism and relational egalitarianism have been used by various theorists to mount significant institutional and policy-focused arguments in recent years. Both neo republicans and relational egalitarians have generated arguments to suppose that markets are or are not compatible with avoiding nondomination and have likewise offered evaluations of economic proposals such as property-owning democracy and the universal welfare state (including Universal Basic Income, or UBI.) Similarly, both neo republicans and relational egalitarians have used the concept of domination to argue for various forms of workplace democracy, as well as other forms of economic democracy such as community wealth building. If there is a reason to prefer the relational egalitarian account of non-domination to the neo-republican account (or vice versa), what implications might that have for the force of these policy arguments?
Through a systematic investigation of these questions, this research project promises to advance and deepen our understanding of two central political values—equality and freedom—and to use that understanding to illuminate precisely what is at stakes in some of the most important contemporary policy debates of our times.
Źródło finansowania
ze środków Narodowego Centrum Nauki oraz programu ramowego Unii Europejskiej w
zakresie badań naukowych i innowacji Horyzont 2020 na podstawie umowy nr 945339 w
ramach działań „Marie Skłodowska-Curie”.
Akronim: EFD
"Socialism and non-domination: a relational egalitarian approach" w czasopiśmie Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy
In recent literature on the philosophical foundations of socialism a growing number of theorists have endorsed the claim that freedom as non-domination is a fundamental normative commitment undergirding socialist politics. On this sort of view, a broad range of traditional socialist claims can be explained and justified by reference to freedom as non-domination. In this paper, I argue that even if these theorists are right that opposition to domination is a core socialist normative commitment, it is not clear that that opposition is best understood in terms of a commitment to a particular conception of freedom. Instead, socialist opposition to domination can be more fruitfully understood as flowing from a commitment to a relational conception of equality, according to which relationships with a substantially egalitarian character have a special value. I argue, first, that a relational egalitarian construal of socialist opposition to domination can retain all of the benefits of the freedom as non-domination construal, and, secondly, that a relational egalitarian account will have benefits that a freedom as non-domination approach will lack. I conclude that there are still significant benefits to retaining a place for equality in our considered account of the normative foundations of socialism.
MacRae, C. Z. (2024). Socialism and non-domination: a relational egalitarian approach. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 1–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/13698230.2024.2348288
"Does domination require unequal power?" w czasopiśmie The Philosophical Quarterly
Until recently, many theorists defined domination such that it requires unequal power, and most others held that even if domination were not defined as requiring unequal power, a requirement of unequal power would nevertheless follow from the definition of what domination is. On these views, unless there is an imbalance of power between the two parties, there can be no relation of domination. However, two prominent theorists have recently broken from this consensus, on the grounds that people can depend on one another's arbitrary or uncontrolled wills even in contexts where there is no inequality of power. In this paper, I argue that this is a mistake: domination theorists have a powerful reason to hold that domination cannot take place without a power imbalance. Consequently, we should only accept definitions of the concept on which domination requires unequal power.
MacRae, C. Z. (2024). Does domination require unequal power? The Philosophical Quarterly, pqae 140. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqae140
"Luck Egalitarianism, Exploitation, and the Normative Foundations of Socialism" w czasopiśmie Moral Philosophy and Politics
According to a prominent account, the central normative commitments of socialism are a luck egalitarian principle of equality and a principle of community or solidarity. The model has a number of attractions. However, it appears to be vulnerable to a series of objections that have been pressed against luck egalitarian accounts of the concept of exploitation. In this paper I argue that, despite some overlooked flexibility, the exploitation objection represents a serious challenge to this model and provides a good reason to explore alternative accounts of socialism’s normative grounds.
MacRae, C. Z. (2025). Luck Egalitarianism, Exploitation, and the Normative Foundations of Socialism. Moral Philosophy and Politics. https://doi.org/10.1515/mopp-2024-0043
"Does Domination Require Unequal Power?"
Interdisciplinary Centre for Ethics Seminar, Jagiellonian University, February 22nd, 2024
"Freedom and Equality in the Socialist Ideal"
European PPE Network Annual Conference, Warwick University, April 27th 2024
"Does Domination Require Unequal Power?"
5th POLEMO Symposium, Central European University, May 16th 2024
"Competing as Equals: Does Relational Equality Require Solidarity?"
Developing Relational Egalitarianism MANCEPT Workshop, Manchester University, September 6th 2024Publikacja na portalu Justice Everywhere
Tytuł artykułu: "In Wisława Szymborska Park: Reflections on 15 Years of Citizens’ Budgets in Poland"
Link do artykułu: https://justice-everywhere.org/democracy/in-wislawa-szymborska-park-reflections-on-15-years-of-citizens-budgets-in-poland/